The Pricing of Climate Risk by Chen, Linda & Gao, Lucia Silva
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Accounting and Finance Faculty Publication Series Accounting and Finance
4-1-2012
The Pricing of Climate Risk
Linda Chen
Lucia Silva Gao
University of Massachusetts Boston, lucia.silva-gao@umb.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/
accounting_finance_faculty_pubs
Part of the Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Accounting and Finance at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Accounting and Finance Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more
information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chen, Linda and Gao, Lucia Silva, "The Pricing of Climate Risk" (2012). Accounting and Finance Faculty Publication Series. Paper 5.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/accounting_finance_faculty_pubs/5
  
 
 
 
The Pricing of Climate Risk 
 
 
 
 
Forthcoming in 
 
 
Journal of Financial and Economic Practice 
 
Linda H. Chen  
Assistant Professor 
College of Management 
University of Massachusetts Boston 
100 Morrissey Boulevard 
Boston, MA 02125 
linda.chen@umb.edu 
 
 
Lucia Silva Gao* 
Assistant Professor 
College of Management 
University of Massachusetts Boston 
100 Morrissey Boulevard 
Boston, MA 02125 
lucia.silva-gao@umb.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Corresponding author 
  
 The Pricing of Climate Risk 
Linda H. Chen; Assistant Professor; University of Massachusetts Boston; linda.chen@umb.edu 
Lucia Silva Gao *; Assistant Professor; University of Massachusetts Boston; lucia.silva-gao@umb.edu 
 This study investigates whether corporate climate risk is priced by the capital markets.  Using 
carbon dioxide emission rates of publicly traded U.S. electric companies, we find that climate risk is 
positively associated with cost of capital measures, more specifically the implied cost of equity and the cost of 
debt. Additionally, we find that equity and debt investors evaluate corporate climate risk differently. The 
results show that the cost of debt decreases with the level of capital intensity, suggesting that debt investors 
value the increase in efficiency resulting from current capital investments. The results also show that the cost 
of equity decreases and the cost of debt increases with the newness of assets in places. Newer equipment is 
likely to be operationally and environmentally more efficient. While the results concerning the cost of debt 
are puzzling, we consider that debt investors may account for other performance indicators. We conclude that 
equity and debt investors evaluate climate risk differently according to their different payoff functions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates whether corporate climate risk is priced by the capital markets.  Using a 
sample of publicly traded U.S. electric companies, we find that firms’ implied cost of equity and cost of 
debt are both positively associated with carbon dioxide emission rates.  Our findings support the notion 
that investors price firms’ climate risk.   
Given the current social, political and environmental debates which emphasize sustainable 
development, investors are paying increasing attention to firms’ social responsibility performance in 
general, and to firms’ environmental performance in particular.  Consequently, more corporate 
disclosures are called for to facilitate investors’ assessment of firms’ environmental risk, pollution costs 
and contingent environmental liabilities.  Regulatory bodies are in the process of providing more 
guidelines regarding the level of environmental disclosures concerning environmental risks at the firm 
level.  For example, following a petition by institutional investors and other organizations [1], the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently released guidance regarding the application of 
existing disclosure requirements to climate change matters, more precisely regarding the physical, 
legislative, regulatory, business and market impacts related to climate change that may have a material 
effect on a company’s business and operations [2].  As stated by the guidance, material information such 
as emission reduction related capital expenditures and firms’ status with respect to cap and trade laws 
should be conveyed to investors.  In addition, information regarding how laws and regulation will 
potentially affect supply and demand for products and services based on their environmental performance 
and carbon content may also be material to investors’ decisions. 
The impact of environmental risk on firm value can be analyzed on two different dimensions, one 
related to the uncertainty of future cash-flows, and the other related to information uncertainty.  The 
uncertainty of future cash-flows arises from future capital expenditures required to comply with 
regulation and legislation, clean-up costs and costs with lawsuits related to accidental spill and other 
uncontrollable events, and contingent environmental liability (Garber and Hammitt, 1998; Cormier, 
Magnan and Morard, 1993; Hughes, 2000; Conar and Cohen, 2001; Clarkson, Li and Richardson, 2004; 
Chapple, Clarkson and Gold, 2009). Future cash flows can also be affected by potential shifts in supply 
and demand, and changes in prices of products and services provided by companies affected by these 
developments.  Moreover, trading markets for emission credits related to “cap and trade” programs might 
be established in the future and could represent both costs and opportunities for companies. 
Information uncertainty or information risk reflects “value ambiguity, or the degree to which a 
firm’s value can be reasonably estimated by even the most knowledgeable investors” (Jiang, Lee and 
Zhang, 2005).  In particular, information uncertainty may be reflected in dispersion of investors’ 
estimates of firms’ future performance (Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004).  Information risk, 
 or value ambiguity, is often translated into further discounting in firm valuation. This type of risk can be 
mitigated through corporate disclosures. The results from studies on environmental disclosure are, 
however, inconclusive (e.g. Richardson and Welker, 2001; Magness, 2009; Jacobs, Singhal and 
Subramanian, 2010). 
In this study we focus on a single industry, the electric utility industry. Electric companies are 
subject to comparable regulations and legislation, capital spending requirements, as well as other costs 
associated with pollution control and reduction. Therefore, information risk is mitigated within our 
sample.  In this way, our findings regarding the pricing of environmental risk can be viewed as while 
holding information uncertainty risk constant.   
Previous studies provide evidence that environmental performance is valued by equity investors 
(e.g. Hamilton, 1995; Khanna, Quimo and Bojilova, 1998; Konar and Cohen, 2001; King and Lenox, 
2002; Clarkson, Li and Richardson, 2004; Clarskon and Li, 2006). However, market prices reflect both 
changes in the expectations for future cash flows and changes in the risk perception of these cash flows. 
Empirical studies which test the relationship between environmental performance and market price do not 
disentangle these effects. This study proposes to estimate the risk perception component of market value 
assessments. 
We use carbon emission rates, obtained from the Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated 
Database (EGRID) issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to measure environmental 
performance. This measurement is based on the assumption that firms with higher carbon emissions rates 
have greater exposure to climate risk. Most of the existing environmental literature uses Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI) data from the EPA to measure environmental performance. Only since January of 2010 
the EPA requires large emitters of greenhouse gases to collect and report data with respect to greenhouse 
gas emissions. Therefore, data on greenhouse gases emissions is available only for companies that have 
voluntarily disclosed this information through sustainability or standalone environmental reports, or that 
report to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The information reported at the individual company level 
is, however, incomplete, unaudited, and difficult to compare. EGRID provides comprehensive 
information on emissions for electric companies collected by the EPA, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Additionally, reporting 
and regulation of toxic chemical releases and waste management has been effective for several years, 
while new developments related to disclosure and regulation of greenhouse gases are anticipated in the 
coming years. Therefore, measures based on greenhouse gases emissions better capture environmental 
risks faced by companies.  
 To assess the market pricing of climate risk, we estimate the implied cost of equity and the cost 
of debt of the companies in our sample.  We use the model proposed by Claus and Thomas Model (2001) 
and a modified version of the Easton model (Easton, 2004; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005) to estimate the 
implied cost of equity. Implied cost of equity models are expectation models that rely heavily on analysts’ 
projections, and as such are subject to biases and forecast errors. The models we employ require shorter 
term forecasts, minimizing forecast errors that are likely to increase as the forecasting horizon increases.  
Moreover, to reduce potential measurement errors, we use the average of the estimates obtained from the 
two models.  Our estimation for the cost of debt is based on yield-to-maturity spreads.  For firms with 
multiple bond issues and different maturities, we select the bonds with the longest maturity.   
Our analysis shows that after controlling for firm size, market to book ratio, leverage, cash flow 
volatility, long-term growth rate, age of assets in place and capital intensity, climate risk is positively 
associated with the cost of capital measures. Additionally, we find that equity investors and bond 
investors evaluate corporate investment strategy differently. Our results show that while capital intensity, 
or overall level of capital investment, does not have a significant effect on the implied cost of equity, it is 
negatively associated with the cost of debt. Capital spending may represent investments in new equipment 
and technologies that are operationally and environmentally more efficient. While equity holders’ payoff 
function has a “call-option” imbedded within, i.e. equity holders will capture the potential incremental 
benefits of investments in future efficiency and pollution costs reductions, bond holders’ payoff function 
is fixed.  However, current capital spending also suggests lower future capital expenditures. Therefore, 
 debt investors value the increase in future efficiency resulting from current capital investments, and 
possibly lower requirements to invest in the future, resulting in less variability in the cash flows available 
for debt stakeholders, and lower default risk. 
Our results also show that the both the cost of debt and the cost of equity are affected by the age 
of the existing equipment. Equity investors value positively the existence of new equipment in the 
company. Conversely, the cost of debt seems to increase with the existence of newer equipment. While 
this result may be puzzling, it may also suggest that bond investors value the existence of newer 
equipment according to additional performance indicators. For example, the existence of newer 
equipment and higher carbon emission rates may suggest that past capital investments realized by the 
company did not result in increased efficiency, and may imply the need for future investments to increase 
efficiency and performance. Future capital expenditures may reduce future cash flows available for debt 
payments, and consequently increase the level of default risk.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief literature review and 
describes the hypothesis.  Section 3 describes the data and variables construction. Section 4 presents the 
empirical analysis and section 5 concludes.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Very few studies empirically investigate the impact of environmental performance on the cost of 
equity and debt. For example, Garber and Hammitt (1998) examined the effect of Superfund liabilities on 
the cost of equity measured based on the CAPM and beta, for a sample of companies in the chemical 
industry.  They found no relationship between balance sheet liabilities identified to cover Superfund 
remediation costs and the cost of equity for small firms, but were able to find a robust positive 
relationship for large firms. It should be noted that Superfund liabilities reflect cleanup costs for past 
emissions and spills.  As such, Superfund liabilities entail a high level of uncertainty relating to final 
cleanup costs but may not provide a strong signal of future environmental performance. In another study, 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) found a positive and significant relationship between environmental risk 
management, a measure based on TRI, and cost of equity, measured based on the CAPM and beta.  
The results of the association between environmental performance and cost of debt are not 
conclusive.  Graham and Maher (2006) demonstrate that the value of accrued environmental liabilities is 
positively associated with bond yields. Bauer and Hann (2010) document that environmental concern is 
associated with higher cost of debt financing and lower credit ratings.  Similarly, Schneider (2010) find 
that the cost of debt increases with poor environmental performance measured based on TRI emissions. 
The results are justified based on the claim that poor environmental performance represents potential 
liabilities related to compliance and clean-up costs due to increasingly strict environmental laws and 
regulations. Conversely, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) show that cost of debt increases with 
environmental risk management, but attribute this increase to an increase in debt financing in the capital 
structure of the firm.   Kim, Surroca and Tribo (2009) argue that reductions in lending rates may simply 
be due to the fact that both borrowers and lenders belong to a similar cohort along the social responsibility 
dimension.    
Several arguments can be used to explain the relationship between the cost of capital and 
environmental performance. Superior environmental performance may be reflected in a reduced cost of 
equity through a lower systematic risk and equity beta. Sharfman and Fernando (2008) argue that firms 
with better environmental risk management will have more flexibility to manage economic downturns, for 
example, by changing its processes. Bansal and Clelland (2004) make a similar argument, but relating to 
unsystematic risk. They argue that poor environmental performance, through the negative impact on the 
firm’s legitimacy, has long term effects on the share price volatility. Superior social responsibility 
performance, on the contrary, tends to attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage, hence 
facilitating the price discovery process (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang and Yang, 2011).  
Environmental risk reduction is associated with good corporate reputation, and good corporate 
reputation is a valuable intangible asset (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006).  It is necessary to point out that 
 the firms “social norms” vary across different industries, geographical areas, and employee 
characteristics[3].  Thus a strong record of environmental performance may enhance or damage reputation 
depending on whether a firm's activities ‘fits’ with environmental concerns in the eyes of stakeholders 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2006).  Therefore, firms coping strategies can be very different.  Other than 
investing in environmental risk reduction, firms can also choose to invest in other areas to minimize 
environmental risk exposure, such as lobbying.  As a matter of fact, Cho, Patten and Roberts (2006) 
reveal a significant, inverse relationship between firm environmental performance and political spending.   
The impact of environmental risk on cost of equity can also result from a smaller base of 
investors in high polluting companies and consequent increase in the cost of equity (Merton, 1987).  
Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) introduced a theoretical model to show that exclusionary ethical 
investing leads to polluting firms being held by fewer investors because green investors will not invest in 
polluting firms’ stock. This lack of risk sharing among non-green investors leads to lower stock prices for 
polluting firms and to an increase in their cost of capital. 
This study investigates the effect of firms’ environmental risk reduction on firm valuation. 
Formally, the hypothesis tested is the following:  
 
Hypothesis:  There is a positive association between a firm’s climate risk level and the cost of capital. 
 
We measure firms’ cost of capital in terms of implied cost of equity and cost of debt. Since equity 
and bond investors value corporate risk differently, our analysis studies the relationship between the cost 
of capital and the level of climate risk separately for equity and debt. 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL, DATA, AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
The primary dataset used in this study was obtained from the Emissions and Generation Resource 
Integrated Database (EGRID) issued by the EPA in 2002, 2006 and 2007. EGRID provides emissions [4], 
generation resource mix and capacity, ownership and corporate affiliation for almost all U.S. electricity 
generating plants. EGRID collects information from three federal agencies: The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).  In addition, firms’ financial statement data was obtained from the 
Compustat Database, analyst forecast data was obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S), and corporate bond trading data from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). 
To address the research questions formalized in the hypothesis presented in the previous section, 
we employ the following model: 
 
Cost of Capitali,t = β0 + β1Emissons Ratei,t + β2Sizei,t + β3M/Bi,t + β4Leveragei,t + β5σ(Cash Flows)i,t 
+ β6Growthi,t +β7Newnessi,t + β8Capital Intensityi,t + εi,t ,                                  (1)    
 where    
Cost of Capitali,t = Implied Cost of Equityit      for the cost of equity analysis, 
= YTM_Spreadit                     for the cost of debt analysis. 
 
The variables construction is discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
Climate Risk Measure 
 
We use carbon emission rates to proxy for climate risk exposure.  This measurement is based on 
the assumption that firms with lower emission rates, and better environmental performance, have less 
exposure to climate risk. Firms with better environmental performance have a strategic competitive 
advantage in anticipation of future regulations or legislation. Superior environmental performers may 
 over-comply with existing regulations, and benefit from the flexibility inherent to voluntary 
environmental initiatives, as they have more time to invest in innovative pollution technologies and 
process improvements without the threat of non-compliance penalties (Boyd, 1998; Khanna and Damon, 
1999). In addition, firms may pursue a pollution reduction strategy to benefit from green consumerism, 
reduce the risk of future environmental liabilities and lawsuits, and increase productivity and efficiency in 
production (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Epstein, 1996; Reinhart, 1999). Carbon dioxide emissions 
rate is calculated as total emissions divided by electricity generation in MWh.   
One limitation regarding the EGRID database is the unavailability of data for some years. EGRID 
was released in the years 2002, 2006 and 2007. EGRID 2002 reports emissions for the years from 1996 to 
2000, EGRID 2006 reports emissions for 2004, and EGRID 2007 reports emissions for 2005. For the 
purpose of this study, we considered emissions in the year of release of the database, not the year that the 
emissions occurred. This construct is based on the assumption that the information was made available to 
investors on the year of release of EGRID. Additionally, we consider the values of emissions also for the 
year subsequent to the release of the data. Therefore, we consider emissions that occurred in 2000 in the 
years 2002 and 2003, emissions that occurred in 2004 are considered in 2006, and emissions that occurred 
in 2005 are considered in 2007 and 2008. In this way, our study includes data for the years 2002, 2003, 
2006, 2007 and 2008.   
 In a related study, Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Munoz (2010) rely on hand-collected carbon-
emissions data for 2006-2008 that S&P 500 firms voluntarily disclosed to the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) and find that increases in carbon emissions are associated with decreases in firm value. However, 
studies based on voluntarily disclosed information suffer from self-selection bias, as firms with better 
environmental performance are more likely to disclose (Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari, 2008).   
 After merging EGRID with I/B/E/S and Compustat data, we obtain a sample size of 182 
company/year observations for the analysis related to the cost of equity. There are total of 44 companies 
represented in the sample.  Merging EGRID with Compustat and the FISD databases, results in a sample 
of 117 company/year observations for the analysis pertaining to the cost of debt, including information 
related to 35 companies.  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the two samples.  The samples are 
comparable in terms of carbon emission rates. The average is 1,643 tons/MWh for companies in the 
equity sample and 1,564 tons/MWH for companies in the bonds sample. 
 
Cost of Capital Measures 
 
 We estimate two measures of cost of capital, the implied cost of equity and the bond yield-to-
maturity spread. The construction of these measures is described below. 
 
 Implied Cost of Equity Measures 
 
Several recent papers examine empirical methods for computing the implied cost of equity capital 
given stock prices and expectations of future earnings (e.g., Botosan 1997; Gebhardt et al. 2001; Claus 
and Thomas 2001; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Easton 2004; Easton and Monahan 2005; Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth 2005). These models use analysts’ forecasts of future earnings and the current stock 
price to estimate the implied cost of capital.  Analysts’ forecasts are often subject to biases and forecast 
errors that may translate into the implied cost of equity measures, making these measures very noisy.  The 
longer the forecasting horizon, the greater are these forecast errors.  For this reason, we use the Claus and 
Thomas (2001) model and the modified Easton Model (Easton, 2004; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005), which 
rely on relatively shorter time horizons.  To further reduce the measurement error, our implied cost of 
equity measure (Cost of Equity) is the average of the Claus and Thomas (2001) model and the modified 
Easton Model.   
The Claus and Thomas model is represented by the following equation:   
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where 
 
rct= implied cost of equity,  
Pt  =  price per share of common stock in June of year t as reported by  
I/B/E/S, 
Bt = book value at the beginning of the year divided by the number of 
common share outstanding in June of year t, 
FEPSt+i= I/B/E/S consensus for the first two years, for years three, four, five, 
consensus forecasts if available, otherwise,  
 FEPSt+i= FEPSt+ i -1 ·(1+LTG),  
LTG= consensus long-term growth forecast reported in June of year t, 
Bt+i= Bt+i-1 + 0.5· FEPSt+1, 
g= rrf  – 0.03 
rrf= risk-free rate equal to the yield on a 10-year Treasury note in June of 
year t. 
Easton (2004) shows that under the assumption of zero dividends and no growth in abnormal 
earnings beyond the forecast horizon (after year 2), the cost of capital is proportional to the inverse of the 
PEG ratio. The resulting formula is given in Equation (3): 
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We follow Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and use FEPS3 and FEPS2 in place of FEPS2 and 
FEPS1.  Botosan and Plumlee (2005) justify this procedure based on two reasons. First, when FEPS2 is 
less than FEPS1 the model cannot be solved, which limits the sample size. In our sample FEPS3 always 
exceeds FEPS2. Second, changes in abnormal earnings beyond the forecast horizon are likely to be 
smaller when using earnings forecasts for periods further away in time. Therefore, we employ the 
following equation: 
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The implied cost of equity variables are multiplied by 100 and are used in percentage terms.  Our 
Cost of Equity measure is the average of the implied cost of equity measures based on the Claus and  
Thomas Model (2004) and the modified Easton Model. Therefore, Cost of Equity = (rct + rpeg)/2. 
 Summary statistics for the Cost of Equity measure are reported in Table 1, Panel A.  The mean for 
the Cost of Equity is 4.598%. This value is consistent with values presented in previous literature.  
 
Bond Yield to Maturity Spread Measure 
 
The bond yield-to-maturity spread (YTM_Spread) is calculated as follows: 
YTM_Spreadit = Bond Yield to Maturityit - Benchmark Yieldt.                                (6) 
 
 Bond Yield to Maturity is calculated by solving the following equation: 
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where  
P0  = bond price at time 0, 
 YTM = estimated yield to maturity, 
T = maturity. 
 
We obtain corporate bond trading data from the FISD database and include bonds with at least 
1800 days (five years) to maturity.  The yield-to-maturity measure for each bond issue is calculated on 
days when there are transactions.  If a corporate bond has more than 60 months and less than 84 months 
to maturity, then YTM_Spread is the difference between the corporate bond’s yield-to-maturity and the 
seven-year Treasury bond rate.  Treasury bond yield data is obtained from the Federal Reserve website.  
All treasury yield data is based on constant maturity.  Carrying out similar grouping criteria, we grouped 
corporate bonds into four different maturity groups, more specifically seven, ten, twenty, and thirty year-
to-maturity groups.  Corporate bonds’ YTM_Spread  is calculated based on the respective benchmark 
treasury bonds’ yields.  For firms that have multiple bonds outstanding with different maturities, we 
choose the observation that has the longest maturity period.  Many utility bonds are thinly traded and, 
therefore, bond pricing is a combination of firms’ credit risk and transaction costs.  Inevitably using the 
yield-to-maturity measure to proxy for cost of debt can be too noisy and may affect our results.  The 
summary statistics for YTM_Spread  are reported in Table 1, Panel B.  The average YTM_Spread is 
2.383%. 
 
Control Variables Construction 
 
 The control variables included in our analyses are firm size, market to book ratio, leverage, cash 
flow volatility, long term growth rate, asset newness, and capital intensity, all of which have be shown in 
previous literature to be associated with firms’ cost of capital (e.g. Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). 
Berk (1995) demonstrates that size exhibits a negative relation with expected returns, as a 
residual risk factor, in an incomplete model of expected returns. Therefore, we expect that the implied 
cost of equity is negatively associated with firm size.  Also, as the firm size increases, more collateral 
assets and longer firms’ history are likely translated into lower cost of debt.  Thus, we expect size to be 
negatively associated with the cost of debt as well.  Size is the value of total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year.  As shown in Table 1, the average value of Size is $17,814 and $18,913 million for the implied 
cost of equity sample and the bond yield to maturity spread sample, respectively.  In order to reduce the 
type I error caused by heteroskedasticity, we use ln(Size) in the regression analyses. 
Fama and French (1993) develop a three factor asset pricing model that includes beta, size and 
market-to-book, and show that this asset-pricing model outperforms the CAPM.  Fama and French (2004) 
use Ohlson’s (1995) residual income framework to formalize the valuation role of the market-to-book 
ratio (M/B) in expected returns and predict a negative relation between M/B and expected return. 
Therefore, M/B should be negatively associated with the cost of equity.  M/B is the ratio of market value 
of common equity to book value of common equity.  As shown in Table 1, the mean M/B is 1.874 and 
1.909 for the implied cost of equity sample and the bond yield to maturity spread sample, respectively. 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the risk of equity capital increases as a firm’s 
leverage increases.  In addition, increased leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy.  Thus, we 
expect that both the cost of equity and cost of debt are positively associated with leverage.  Leverage is 
the ratio of long-term debt to market value of common equity.  As shown in Table 1, the average value for 
Leverage is 1.874 and 1.909 for the implied cost of equity sample and the bond yield to maturity spread 
sample, respectively. 
Cash flow volatility captures the fluctuation of firms’ cash flows from operation.  High cash flow 
volatility means higher uncertainty about firms’ cash flows. Therefore, this measure should be negatively 
associated with cost of capital (Francis et al. 2004).  σ(Cash Flows) is the standard deviation of a firm’s 
Cash Flows over the prior five years.  Cash Flows is cash flow from operations scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of the year.  As shown in Table 1, the average of σ(Cash Flows)  is 0.019 and 0.020 for the 
 implied cost of equity sample and the bond yield to maturity spread sample, respectively.  The values are 
very low, suggesting that electricity generating firms’ cash flows from operations are very steady. 
La Porta (1996) shows empirically that high expected-growth stocks have higher standard 
deviations of returns and higher betas when compared with low expected-growth stocks. Growth is the 
mean I/B/E/S analyst long-term growth in earnings per share forecast for each year of estimation. We 
expect the coefficient of Growth to be positive. 
Firms with newer equipment, with newer and less polluting technologies, are likely to have 
superior environmental performance relatively to their industry peers (Clarkson, Li, Richardson and 
Vasvari, 2008).  Newness is the ratio of Net Property, Plant and Equipment to Property, Plant and 
Equipment at cost.  
Firms with higher capital expenditures are investing in new equipment. These upgrades and 
investments should improve environmental efficiency (Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari, 2008).  
Capital Intensity is the ratio of capital expenditures for the year divided by total sales revenues at the end 
of the previous year. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients between the variables included in our model. Panel A 
shows that Cost of Equity is positively correlated with cash flow volatility (σ(Cash Flows)) and firms’ 
growth prospect (Growth), and negatively correlated with market to book ratio (M/B) and newness of 
fixed assets (Newness).  Emissions Rate is negatively correlated with Size and, as expected, with Newness.  
Panel B shows that YTM_Spread is positively correlated with Emissions Rate, σ(Cash Flows), and 
Newness, and negatively correlated with M/B and Capital Intensity. 
Since we use panel data, all models are estimated using pooled cross-sectional regressions with 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Table 3 reports the results of multivariate regressions of 
Cost of Equity on Emissions Rate and control variables.  While the univariate regression represented in 
Model 1 does not reveal a significant relationship between Cost of Equity and Emissions Rate, the results 
of Model 2 show that the coefficient of the variable Emissions Rate becomes significant at the 5% level 
(t-stat.=2.214, p<0.05) after controlling for firm size, market to book, leverage, volatility of cash flows 
and growth. Model 3 introduces two more variables to control for the age of the equipment and capital 
investment intensity. Additionally, Model 3 shows that Cost of Equity is positively associated with 
Growth (t-stat.= 4.210, p<0.01) and σ(Cash Flows) (t-stat.=1.945, P<0.1), which are likely indicators of 
current and future risk.  Cost of Equity is negatively associated with M/B (t-stat=-4.051,p<0.01), which 
proxies for intangible good will.  Environmental risk management may result in corporate goodwill, and 
goodwill may reduce the cost of equity.   
Table 4 shows that there is a positive and significant association between Emissions Rate and  
YTM_Spread (t-stat.=2.506, p <0.01). Therefore, our results point to the direction that cost of debt is 
positively associated with climate risk.  Furthermore, as shown in Model 3, we find that YTM_Spread is 
also positively related with Leverage (t-stat.=2.109,p<0.05) and σ(Cash Flows) (t-stat.=2.136,p<0.05), 
which are likely to be associated to default risk. Cost of debt decreases with the value of M/B (t-stat.=-
2.289, p<0.05).  
The results regarding the effect of the age of the firm’s assets in place and capital intensity on the 
cost of equity and debt are somewhat intriguing. We analyze the results based on the different payoff 
functions of equity and debt investors. While equity holders’ payoff function has a “call-option” 
imbedded within, i.e. equity holders will capture the potential incremental benefits of investments in 
future efficiency and pollution costs reductions, bond holders’ payoff function is fixed and as such bond 
investors will not benefit from the potential incremental value from these investments.  Additionally, the 
debt holders’ stake is better protected with lower levels of cash outflow, and consequent decrease in the 
level of default risk and bankruptcy costs.  
In the regression relating to the cost of equity (Table 3, Model 3), the coefficient of the variable 
Newness is negative and significant at the 10% level (t-stat.=-1.851). Newer equipment is likely to be 
 operationally and environmentally more efficient. Therefore, Newness might be associated with a lower 
level of exposure to climate risk.  Newness might also signal lower requirements for future investments in 
the company.    
On the contrary of the results obtained for the cost of equity, the cost of debt is inversely related 
to the age of assets in place in the company. While this result may seem puzzling, it may also suggest that 
bond investors value the existence of newer equipment according to additional performance indicators. 
For example, newer equipment might be associated with operational and environmental performance, but 
if the company emits relatively high carbon emission rates it may imply that past capital investments 
realized by the company did not result in increased efficiency. It may also suggest that the company needs 
to invest in new equipment and efficiency in the near future. Future capital expenditures may imply lower 
cash flows available for debt payments, and consequently higher default risk. 
The coefficient of Capital Intensity is statistically insignificant in our sample for the cost of 
equity analysis, although we would expect that equity investors benefit from future improvements in 
efficiency from capital spending. 
The coefficient of Capital Intensity is statistically significant at the 5% level in the bonds sample 
(t-stat.=-1.982, p<0.05). This result suggests that risk of debt investment decreases with capital spending. 
It may also imply lower future capital expenditures requirements, higher future cash flows available for 
debt payments, and consequently lower default risk. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates whether corporate climate risk is priced by the capital market.  Using 
carbon dioxide emission rates of publicly traded U.S. electric companies, we conclude that the cost of 
equity and debt financing increase with the level of exposure to climate risk. The results hold after 
controlling for firm size, market to book ratio, leverage, cash flow volatility, long-term growth rate, asset 
newness and capital intensity. 
Additionally, our results suggest that equity investors and bond investors evaluate corporate 
climate risk from different lights.  While the effect of capital intensity on implied cost of equity is not 
statistically significant, the cost of debt decreases with new capital investments. We argue that debt 
investors value the increase in future efficiency resulting from current capital investments, and possibly 
lower requirements to invest in the future, resulting in less variability in the cash flows available for debt 
stakeholders. 
The results concerning the relationship between the cost of capital and the age of assets in place 
are rather puzzling. While the cost of equity decreases, the cost of debt increases with newer assets in 
place. Newer equipment is likely to be operationally and environmentally more efficient. Therefore, we 
expect firms with newer equipment to have a lower level of exposure to climate risk. We consider that the 
results from the debt analysis may be due to bond investors’ valuation according to additional 
performance indicators. The main variable in our analysis is carbon emissions rates. Companies with 
newer equipment but relatively high carbon emission rates may still require future capital investments in 
pollution reduction technologies and, consequently, there will be lower cash flows available for debt 
payments, and higher levels of default risk. 
By focusing on one industry we are able to control for industry-wide factors. However, our study 
is limited by the small sample size and reduced statistical power of the analysis. Since large emitters of 
greenhouse gases are required to collect and report data with respect to greenhouse gas emissions to the 
EPA since 2010, carbon data will be available in the near future. Future research could extend this study 
to other industries. 
 
NOTES 
[1] On September 18, 2007, a group of investors, state officials and non‐profit organizations requested that the SEC 
issue guidance clarifying that corporations must disclose material climate risks under existing law. A copy of the 
 Petition is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf  and 
http://www.ceres.org//Document.Doc?id=358 
[2] http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf 
[3] For example, external constituents such as customers, regulators, legislators, local communities, and 
environmental activist organizations, are more likely dictate corporate environmental risk reduction strategy 
(Delmas and Toffel, 2008). 
 
[4] EGRID reports emissions resulting from the generation for carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, nitrogen 
oxides, sulfur dioxide and mercury.  For the purpose of this study, we focus on carbon emissions rates. 
 
  
 Table 1 - Descriptive statistics   
 
Panel A – The Implied Cost of Equity Sample (2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 182 firm-year observations) 
Mean Std. Dev. 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile 
Cost of Equity (%) 4.598 1.284 3.906 4.335 4.975 
Size*          17,814          13,498          6,271          14,059           28,271  
Market Value Equity*      2,460        2,691          509        1,482          3,590  
Log(M/B) 1.874 0.924 1.340 1.688 2.122 
Leverage 0.310 0.074 0.272 0.308 0.349 
σ(Cash Flows) 0.019 0.012 0.011 0.017 0.022 
Growth 6.912 3.230 4.680 6.140 8.140 
Newness 0.644 0.070 0.595 0.638 0.689 
Capital Intensity 0.065 0.026 0.047 0.064 0.082 
Emissions Rate 1643 676 1216 1696 1998 
 
Panel B – The Cost of Debt Sample (2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 117 firm-year observations) 
Mean Std. Dev. 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile 
YTM Spread (%) 2.383 2.453 1.155 1.833 2.485 
Size* 18,913 13,893 7,361 14,901 29,873 
Market Value Equity* 2,615 3,097 465 1,416 3,600 
M/B 1.909 1.080 1.299 1.677 2.118 
Leverage 0.334 0.087 0.277 0.326 0.371 
σ(Cash Flows) 0.020 0.014 0.009 0.017 0.024 
Growth 6.811 2.874 4.850 6.240 7.935 
Newness 0.650 0.073 0.598 0.647 0.699 
Capital Intensity 0.066 0.028 0.047 0.061 0.085 
Emissions Rate 1564 588 1208 1689 1984 
 
*In Millions of dollars. 
  
  
Table 2 - Pearson Correlation Coefficients   
 
Panel A – The Implied Cost of Equity Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Cost of Equity (1)      1 
Emissions Rate (2)      0.076   1 
Size (3)      0.009 -0.564***  1 
M/B (4)     -0.313*** -0.004  0.122  1 
Leverage (5)     -0.125*  0.019  0.140*  0.257***  1 
σ(Cash Flows) (6)      0.193***  0.104 -0.143* -0.038 -0.007  1 
Growth (7)      0.202*** -0.058  0.053  0.321***  0.001  0.072 1 
Newness (8)     -0.143* -0.264***  0.200***  0.039  0.057 -0.145* 0.096 1 
Capital Intensity (9)      0.026  0.125* -0.131  0.002 -0.086  0.016 0.179** 0.202*** 1 
 
 
Panel B – The Cost of Debt Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
YTM_Spread (1)      1   
Emissions Rate (2)      0.212**  1        
Size (3)     -0.085 -0.507***     1  
M/B (4)     -0.206** -0.003    -0.065  1  
Leverage (5)      0.122  0.306***    -0.009  0.233**  1  
σ(Cash Flows) (6)      0.259***  0.236**    -0.201**  0.081 -0.037  1  
Growth (7)      0.022 -0.164*     0.205**  0.011  0.004 -0.136 1   
Newness (8)      0.157* -0.203**     0.179* -0.013 -0.009 -0.134 0.283
***
 1 
Capital Intensity (9)     -0.244***   0.099    -0.054  0.155*  0.036 -0.077 0.073 0.143    1 
 
The significance levels are given by: *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. 
 
 
 Table 3 - Regressions of the Implied Cost of Equity on Carbon Emissions Rate 
 
 Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 4.311 2.231 3.534 
22.916*** 2.207** 2.810*** 
Emissions Rate (+) 0.279 0.700 0.561 
0.999 2.214** 1.733* 
Size (-) 0.213 0.213 
2.220** 2.195** 
M/B (-) -0.916 -0.899 
-4.122*** -4.051*** 
Leverage (+) -1.601 -1.409 
-1.510 -1.329 
σ(Cash Flows) (+) 13.316 12.092 
2.146** 1.945* 
Growth (+) 0.112 0.110 
4.236*** 4.210*** 
Newness (?) -2.103 
-1.851* 
Capital Intensity (?) 0.647 
0.198 
Adj. R2 0.161 0.316 0.329 
F-statistics 8.517 8.810 7.581 
Number of Obs 182 182 182 
 
All models are estimated using pooled cross-sectional regressions with robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level. t-statistics are reported below each coefficient in italic. The significance levels for the 
independent variables are given by: *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. 
 
  
 Table 4 - Regressions of the Bond Yield to Maturity Spread on Carbon Emissions Rate 
 
Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 2.522 1.359 -4.271 
4.884*** 0.492 -1.301 
Emissions Rate (+) 1.497 1.634 2.424 
1.903* 1.639 2.506*** 
Size (-) -0.020 0.021 
-0.074 0.084 
M/B (-) -2.554 -2.223 
-2.546** -2.289** 
Leverage (+) 6.585 5.547 
2.387** 2.109** 
σ(Cash Flows) (+) 28.301 34.690 
1.657* 2.136** 
Growth (?) 0.088 0.032 
1.127 0.432 
Newness (?) 9.679 
3.219*** 
Capital Intensity (?) -18.978 
-1.982** 
Adj. R2 0.177 0.279 0.370 
F-statistics 6.015 3.998 4.852 
Number of Obs 117 117 117 
 
All models are estimated using pooled cross-sectional regressions with robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level. t-statistics are reported below each coefficient in italic. The significance levels for the 
independent variables are given by: *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. 
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